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ABSTRACT 
In this report I call attention to the ageing of Europe’s community and the disadvantageous effect of 
ageing. I list methods that could be applied to moderate this process and propose some alternative 
solution laying much more stress upon the replacement of population. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The demographic processes are among the most important factors influencing a particular 
region’s growth opportunities. Demographic processes are dependent on typically slowly 
changing but basic factors such as the values and habits of strata and individuals, or the 
institutional framework and interests in a society. The impacts of demographic processes 
become visible only in the very long run, often reflecting decade- or even century-long 
tendencies hence their huge inertia. Consequently, they can be predicted with a high level of 
certainty, and if adverse changes are prognosticated, only a concerted and strong series of 
acts can yield favourable results. 
When discussing the subject, we may not ignore the fact that countries coping with 
population fall are characterised by the exaggerated and prodigal consumption, the 
consumerism, thus a disproportionately high value of “ecological footprint”
1, compared to the 
global average. Consequently, a population rise in these regions would work towards 
unsustainability, or in other words, towards the more or less well-grounded vision of a global 
disaster [1] more intensively than it would in the developing countries. From this aspect we 
may regard population decrease as a favourable process in these areas, for this is one of the 
preconditions for the society to avoid bumping into its own ecological limits. However, in the 
following decades a no less exciting issue will be how to handle problems triggered by 
population decrease, and this is what I wish to deal with in my writing. 
Even today, the explosive increase in population defines the limitations of sustainability and 
balance in many “developing” countries. Nevertheless, despite the fact that this is likely to 
remain the core problem in the future as well, by today the situation has changed in many 
aspects. As is shown in Figure 1, there was a turning point in the growth of the world’s population 
in the 90s. Up to that time, the world’s population grew at an accelerating pace, while in the 
90s the tendency took the opposite direction, i.e. the population growth was decelerating. This 
change took place earlier in the developed countries, so that in Europe and Japan the aging of 
the population has posed an ever-increasing challenge for society for quite some time. 
 
Figure 1. Long-term world population growth, 1750 to 2050 (source UNDP). S. Türei 
90 
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
The problem is not only that people live longer in the developed world, which changes the 
age composition of the population. The major cause of aging is the extremely low fertility 
rate, which is about 1,4 in the European countries, well below the replacement level, 2,1. In 
most European countries the number of new-borns remains well below that observed in 
earlier generations, so that without immigrants the population of European countries would 
go down by nearly 1 million each year. 
What is more, according to forecasts, Europe has not touched the bottom yet [2]. By 2050 
several countries in Europe will face a considerable population fall. For example, the 
decrease in Ukraine’s population will reach 20 million (40 %), in Belarus or Bulgaria 30 %, 
while in some Eastern and Middle European countries a 15-25 % population drop is 
projected. The problem is not confined to the former socialist countries. Europe at large is 
also facing the problem of decreasing population, even though to a lesser extent. In 2050, the 
number of Italians and Spaniards will be 16 million and 9 million less, respectively, than it 
was at the time of the millennium. 
The problem is no that some regions or countries will be less populous tomorrow: in areas 
with high environmental load population decrease may even be interpreted as a favourable 
process. Notwithstanding their decreasing population, most of the countries in Europe will 
still be among the most densely populated areas of the world. The problem is rather 
represented by the decline in population itself, and all its consequences. Due to a lower 
fertility rate and increased life expectancy, the median age of the population rises at an 
outstandingly fast pace, growing by 10 years in the first half of the 21st century, and probably 
exceeding 47 years by 2050, that is, at that time over the half of the population will be older 
than
2 47. Even more frightening is the outlook that the proportion of those over 85 will be 
nearly tripled to a value over 11 %, while the proportion of children under 14 will fall by 
nearly one-fifth, hardly exceeding the percentage of over 85. 
According to predictions (EPC and EC (2005)), even counting with a slight increase in the 
proportion of working population by 2050, the number of working population will fall by 
some 9 million, mainly due to a 16 % (48 million) drop in the working age population. 
Meanwhile, the number of over-65s is projected to increase by 58 million (77 %), doubling 
the old-age dependency ratio to 54,5 % from the present 24,5 %. The so-called effective old-
age dependency ratio (meaning the ratio of over-65, non-active and working people) will rise 
to a similar extent, from 37 % to 70 % between 2003 and 2050. At present, the ratio between 
working age people and over-65s is 4:1. This proportion will change to less than 2:1. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the above discussed changes in age composition. In my view, these 
changes affect economy in two ways. On the one hand, the elderly population is generally 
less dynamic, innovative and adaptive, which will have a slowing-down effect on the increase 
in productivity. Most probably, this factor already has a significant influence on European 
economy, as the European population is already the oldest in the world, and the pace of 
increase in productivity has been decreasing for decades in the region [3]. 
On the other hand, the above changes also result in a rise in the expenses and the emergence 
of financing issues. The problem is already present, as we find it increasingly hard to finance 
the rising costs of old-age health care and other related services. According to EU estimations [4], 
the related extra expenses reach 3-4 % of the GDP. As in Europe the health care and pension 
systems are almost exclusively financed by the state, the new situation may force 
governments to increase related spending by at least 10 %, providing the present structure of 
financing remains. Can we slow down the alarming rate of Europe’s aging? 
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Figure 2. Changes in the age structure of the EU25 population [4]. 
However, I think that these predictions roughly underestimate the expected extra costs, 
because, as shown above, the number of over-65s will rise by nearly 80 %, and even if we 
look only at the number of pensioners, and take a higher age of retirement into consideration, 
the number of pensioners will still be at least one and a half times higher. Within this group 
the proportion of over-80s will show a more pronounced increase. This fact suggests a sharp 
rise in health-care and pension-related expenses. As far as the other end of the scale is 
concerned, a lower number of younger people, consequently lower educational and 
dependency-related expenses, but longer educational periods and thus higher relative costs as 
well should be taken into consideration. However, in general, a major increase in the 
expenses spent on the inactive population should be expected. 
It seems even more true if, stepping beyond a general consideration of the likely increase in 
expenses, we examine the cost rises in comparison with the dropping number of working 
population, who practically finance inactive people. From this aspect, the burden on the 
working population will gradually increase in the form of growing social security expenses 
and taxes. These are strongly discouraging factors in terms of producing income. 
The set of problems outlined above basically stems from the fact that Europe’s population 
does not reproduce itself, European women do not give birth to enough children to maintain 
the population. Meanwhile, an ever-longer life expectancy is added to the situation. Is there a 
way to ease the above problems? 
DISCUSSION 
I see three major ways of solving the problem: First, we may increase immigration [5, 6] 
from areas outside Europe. At present, the net volume of the increase is 0,3 % per year, 
which is almost enough to counter-balance the natural decline of the population, but is far 
from being enough to stop unfavourable changes in age composition and the ageing process
3. 
Nevertheless, migration plays an important role in the reproduction of Europe’s population. 
Unfortunately, European societies do not seem to have realised the significance of migration 
in an area where the working age population is gradually shrinking and the elderly population 
is massively growing. This realisation must be the first step toward a more open society and 
labour market, and the integration of migrants and acceptance of cultural diversity. However, S. Türei 
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fertility is highly culture-dependent, so there may be a real concern that migrants, providing 
that they adopt local cultural attitudes, will soon prefer having only one or two children. 
On the other hand, we can encourage people to work longer and retire at a later age, and this 
is exactly what European governments and OECD [7] appear to aim at. Its significance is 
highlighted by the fact that life expectancy of both women and men is predicted to grow by 
an average of 5-6 years in the EU in the first half of the 21st century [4]. If longer life 
expectancy will not be accompanied by an increasing number of years at work, the age of 
retirement will not get higher and the elderly dependency ratio will worsen. As a 
consequence, the financiability and sustainability of pension systems will become 
questionable. By contrast, if longer life expectancy does not result in longer time spent in the 
pension system, i.e. higher overall amount of pension paid, but rather increases the length of 
the period throughout which people pay contributions, the burden on the population will 
altogether ease. In fact, it is quite logical that longer life should mean a longer period spent at 
work, which is to improve the ratio of the active and inactive periods of life. 
From a different point of view, the number of active years is limited by the labour market 
situation, which is likely to be even more influential in this sense than demographical 
processes [8]. If the amount of pension would be more directly dependent on the actual value 
of the contribution paid by people and people’s expected life length, it is likely that instead of 
seeking to retire as early as possible, people would rather stay at work for as long as they can. 
Governments could support this option by a progressive decrease in the amount of 
contributions to be paid in the last quarter of the expected life length. Of course, business 
actors might also facilitate the process by concluding contracts in which the amount of 
pension is established to correlate with contribution payments over a whole life, not just with 
the income received in the last few years, and also by accepting to a larger extent the 
possibility of declining wages in the last years of life
4. 
Efforts to promote retirement at a later age as well as other ways to increase employment in 
Europe seems even more arguable if we consider that the main reason for Europe’s lagging 
behind the US is the lower number of years spent at work, though in recent decades the US 
significantly outstripped Europe both in terms of productivity and its growth rate. This 
solution could, in spite of the unfavourable changes in age composition, counter-balance the 
worsening dependency ratio to a certain extent and increase growth pace (or at least decrease 
the rate of slowing down). Furthermore, a higher level of employment is likely to decrease 
dramatically income discrepancies in the society, and the level of income redistribution 
required for the decrease of this discrepancy. 
The above two directions are very important in terms of taming the aging process and 
improving the dependency ratio. However, on the long run, a significant improvement of the 
fertility rate should also be targeted, that is, we should urge people to raise more children. 
Long-term results may only be provided by a better fertility rate, even if the rising number of 
new-borns will increase youth dependency first, and working age population only decades later. 
I think that the fertility rate is hard to influence on the long run. This is why more radical and 
consistent social and welfare policies should be introduced by European governments, instead 
of the existing methods. At present, governments in Europe try to increase fertility rate by providing 
benefits and allowances. However, this method is hardly successful (because the fertility rates 
are so low and their mitigating effects on the income inequalities are insufficient
 [9]), and 
drives up state expenses and decelerates economic growth. Despite the redistribution system, 
the major factor resulting in per capita income disparities between families is the number of 
children. It is quite logical, as the income provided to children is far bellow the income level 
of working parents, consequently, raising children means a significantly lower livings Can we slow down the alarming rate of Europe’s aging? 
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standard. The existing income structure is especially responsible for decreasing fertility rates in 
the countries of Europe. For the causes of the low fertility rates in Europe see [9 – 12]. 
Financing the benefits provided to families with children from extra taxes paid by those 
without children, instead of the general pot of taxes and social contributions, would 
encourage people to raise children in two ways: first, it would put an extra burden on those 
not contributing to social reproduction, thus making the idea of living without children less 
desirable; and second, it would allow governments to provide higher allowances to families 
with children. Not only would this solution encourage people more effectively to have 
children, but it would also help balance the relative income levels
5. 
A society can be considered healthy only if it is able to reproduce itself. If the individuals in a 
society fail to perform in line with this, it is the government’s task to establish criteria that 
make living without children less desirable, and encourage people to contribute to the social 
reproduction. 
REMARKS 
1The concept was introduced in the ecological literature by William Rees [13]. 
2The data relate to the European Union, not the whole of Europe. 
3One of the United Nation’s forecasts dealing with demographical and migration trends [14] 
provides a calculation as to how many immigrants should move to Europe in the first half of 
the century to maintain population (96 million people), or to keep the ratio between the 
number of those between 15 and 64 and over 65s (more than 1350 million people). 
4The role of the resilience of the labour market and wages is highlighted by, for example, 
studies written by the world bank’s authors [15, 16]. 
5An alternative or supplementary solution of the problem may be to let parents have a share 
in the human capital of their natives. 
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MOŽEMO LI USPORITI ALARMANTNU STOPU 
STARENJA EUROPE? 
S. Türei
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SAŽETAK 
U ovom radu ističem starenje Europskog društva i nedostatke koje donosi opće starenje. Navodim metode koje 
se može primijeniti radi usporavanja tog procesa i predlažem alternativno rješenje koja postavlja znatno veće 
zahtjeve na zamjenu stanovništva. 
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